The members of the Security Council underlined their unwavering support for Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and his efforts to reach an agreement on a nationwide ceasefire, humanitarian and economic action and the resumption of an inclusive political process led by Yemen and Yemen, as set out in relevant United Nations resolutions. , including Resolution 2216 (2015), as well as the initiative and implementation mechanism of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as the conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference. They expressed deep concern about the slow pace of negotiations and called on the parties to approve the hastily negotiated proposals. They welcomed the announcement of a ceasefire in Abyan between the Yemeni government and the South Yemen Transition Council and the commitment of coalition observers to the ceasefire, and paid tribute to the coalition`s efforts in this regard. They then asked the parties to quickly implement the provisions of the Riyadh agreement. The members of the Security Council called on the parties to commit in good faith to allow a return to peace in Yemen. The ceasefire between Yemen`s Houthi rebels and forces loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in the port city of Hodeida came into existence on December 18. The agreement was reached earlier this month at the UN-brokered talks in Stockholm. At the time of the negotiations, the city was almost in the hands of the Saudi-led coalition. The coalition had blockaded the port, the main conducted for humanitarian aid to enter Yemen, for months, and the fighters, mostly UAE soldiers, were battling the rebels. The United Nations and the wider international community should urge each side to immediately put an end to measures that appear to be prompting the other to move away from the agreement.

They must also begin implementing the agreement, which requires more cooperation between the Houthis (see below). Following the talks on Sweden, the UN was forced to hastily hold a ceasefire in Hodeida governorate, which began on 18 December. But the parties did not agree with the ground rules. Unlike most ceasefire agreements, the agreement did not contain technical details on the extent, nature or duration of the cessation of hostilities; Definition of offences; or mechanisms to quickly stop the fight when it starts again. The failure of such an agreement – probably because of the urgency of an agreement – has had negative consequences. What complicates matters further is that the UN has not yet deployed a full surveillance team – which requires the approval of the Security Council – making the fate of the ceasefire vulnerable to the war of narratives that has mostly tormented attempts to build a peace process. You can read our analysis of the agreement here, but its main elements were a prisoner exchange, a mutual redeployment agreement of Hodeida – the port, the city and its surroundings – and the obligation to discuss de-escalation in another front-line town, Taiz. The Hodeida agreement in particular was vital. A battle around this Red Sea port threatened to cut off a trade route that accounts for 70 percent of key goods shipped into Yemen, and damit pushing the country into famine. As the crisis group has already said, the EU and Oman have good contacts with the Houthis and Iran has repeatedly proposed to mediate in Yemen.

Now would be a good moment for Tehran to prove its willingness and ability to convince the Huthis to engage constructively on Hodeida, first and foremost by allowing Cammaert`s team freedom of movement in the territory they hold and by encouraging quick, meaningful and `berifiable redeployment from the three ports. Brussels and Muscat can also help by caring for the Houthis in Sanaa and abroad, expressing support for redeployments and making it clear that their patience is waning. During his recent trip to Sanaa, Griffiths urged rebel leader Abdel-Malek al-Huthi to reaffirm his commitment to the agreement, including redistribution.